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  This paper examines the development of the Tokyo Stock Exchange since its 
inception in 1878 to the mid-1930s.  Special attention is paid to the increases in the 
number of listed stocks throughout this period.  By the mid-1930s, the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange had grown to a market bigger (measured relative to GDP) than many 
contemporary stock exchanges in major economies.  Even compared with the stock 
exchanges in major countries today, the pre-war Tokyo Stock Exchange was quite large.   
New listings in the spot market section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange were not restricted 
for most of this period.    Our regression analysis reveals that many firms decided to list 
their stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as they became older and bigger.  The 
commercial code change in 1911, which increased the protection of outside shareholders, 
also had a positive impact on the listings on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  The Tokyo 
Stock Exchange reform of 1918 that aimed at standardization of the spot transactions 
increased the listings on the Exchange.  The analysis also suggests that in the earlier 
period, there was a “home bias” that the companies located in the Eastern part of Japan 
(closer to the Tokyo Stock Exchange) were more likely to be listed in the Tokyo Stock 




     Promotion of the capital market has been one of the major financial policy issues 
facing Japan (Sectional Committee on Financial System, Financial System Council 
2003).    As banks have played a central role in corporate finance and governance in the 
post-war period, there is an influential view that the bank-oriented financial system has 
been dominant since the late nineteenth century, when Japan embarked upon its 
modern economic development (Research Institute of the Bank of Japan 1986, 1995; 
Ishii 1997, 1999).  In contrast, we have stressed that in the pre-war period, the 
Japanese economic system had characteristics substantially different from those in the 
post-war period, and that with respect to the financial system, in particular, the capital 
market and shareholders played a central role in corporate finance and governance 
(Okazaki 1993, 1995, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001).    To put it in terms 
of Allen and Gale[2000], we consider that the financial system in pre-war Japan was 
market-oriented, unlike the post-war bank-oriented system.  It seems that this view 
has been gradually accepted by other researchers (Allen and Gale 2000; Fujino and 
Teranishi 2000; Miwa and Ramseyer 2002; Teranishi 2003).  The fact that different 
financial systems worked in one country in different periods, and that a transition from 
one to another occurred, is very important to understanding the financial systems from 
comparative institutional perspectives (Allen and Gale 2000; Aoki 2001; LaPorta et al 
1997).  
     Based on the viewpoint described above, we have been working on a project to 
explore how and why the capital market developed and came to play a major role in 
pre-war Japan.  In this paper, as a part of the project, we focus on the development of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Tokyo Kabushiki Torihikijo, TSE hereafter), the largest 
stock exchange in pre-war Japan.  The organized secondary market led to the 
enhanced efficiency of corporate finance and governance, through increasing liquidity of 
stocks and making appropriate stock prices.  In fact, at least in the late 1920s and 
1930s, the volume of stocks traded at exchanges in Japan were very large, compared 
with the US in the same period, as well as compared with Japan in the post-war period.   
It is noteworthy that stock exchanges developed rapidly in late 19th and early 20th 
century in Japan, which had just started upon the process modern economic 
development, both from the standpoint of comparative financial systems and policy 
making.   
However, there has been little research on Japanese stock exchanges in the 
pre-war period (Shimura[1970]; Noda[1980]; Kataoka[1987]).  At this moment, even 
such basic information as the companies listed on the TSE and the changes in this list over time is unavailable.    This is partly because the official histories of the TSE do not 
have sufficient information (TSE 1928, 1933, 1938 1963, 2002), but also due to the fact 
that researchers have not taken an interest in stock exchanges, which, in turn, is 
attributable to the above-mentioned view that the Japanese financial system has been 
bank-oriented since the pre-war period.     
Therefore, in this paper, we start by exploring what companies were listed on the 
TSE.  As stated in the following section, a comprehensive list of the companies listed 
on the TSE can be constructed for each year from 1878, when the TSE was established, 
using documents held at the TSE and other supplementary materials.    Next, the list is 
matched with the information on the attributes of the companies including industry, 
scale, and establishment year. Using this dataset, the transition of the attributes of the 
population of the TSE listed companies can be elucidated.  Then, the determinants 
that led to a new listing are econometrically analyzed, focusing on the cotton spinning 
companies, for which detailed data are available.  Pagano et al.[1998] analyzed the 
determinants of IPOs, using the data of contemporary Italy.    The distinctive feature of 
our paper is that we observe new listings using long-term data collected from the early 
stages of the capital market development (1905-1936).  In this period, the Japanese 
economy experienced several institutional and fundamental changes.  Taking 
advantage of this characteristic, we hope to shed light on the phenomena, specific to 
emerging capital markets, as well as the implications of the institutional changes.     
 
2.Financial system and stock market in pre-war Japan: An overview   
     To begin with, let us confirm the scale of the stock market in pre-war Japan.  
Figure 1 shows the total market value of the stocks listed on all the stock exchanges in 
Japan normalized by GNP (GDP in the post-war period).  In the pre-war period, this 
ratio was around 1.0, which is substantially higher than that in post-war period, except 
during the “bubble” period in the late 1980s.  In particular, the ratio was as low as 
0.2-0.3 in the high growth period.  Also, we can confirm the scale of the pre-war stock 
market in terms of the volume of stocks traded.  Until the Sino-Japanese War broke 
out in 1937, the total volume of the stocks traded on all the exchanges was 2 to 2.5 times 
greater than GNP.    On the other hand, the ratio was only 0.1 to 0.3 in the high growth 
period, and it was lower than 1.0 even in the bubble period.  In terms of the scale 
relative to GNP, the pre-war stock market was much larger than that in the post-war 
period.  
     Figure 2a and 2b show international comparisons of the pre-war stock markets.  
Contemporary international data were quoted from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine[2001].  We added comparable data for pre-war Japan and the US to their data.   
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine focus on three ratios as measures to evaluate the 
development of the capital market, namely, (the total market value of the listed 
stocks)/GDP, (the total value of the stocks traded)/GDP, and (the total value of the stocks 
traded)/(the total market value of the listed stocks). In terms of all these three measures, 
the stock market in Japan in 1936 was more developed than that in the US.  Also, the 
stock market in pre-war Japan was highly developed, even when compared with most of 
the countries in the Demirguc-Kunt and Levine[2001] data. Furthermore, as stock 
market development positively correlates with the development of the national economy 
in terms of per capita income (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2001), the high level of stock 
market development in pre-war Japan is still more striking, when we take into account 
the fact that per capita income was not particularly high in pre-war Japan.    This result 
is inconsistent with the conventional view that the Japanese financial system has been 
bank-oriented since the late nineteenth century.  
     Let us examine the importance of the stock market from another standpoint.  
Table 1 shows the increase of the liabilities of the private non-financial corporate sector 
in each five-year period, based on a table of financial assets and liabilities as estimated 
by Fujino and Teranishi [2000]. A couple of interesting points are revealed in Table 2.  
First, while the proportion of the stock market was as high as more than 40% in the 
1880s and the first half of the 1890s, the ratio of bank borrowings was still higher, and 
the latter went up in the latter half of the 1890s.  Second,  the  ratio  of the stock market 
started to rise in the latter half of the 1910s, and this trend continued until the first half 
of the 1930s.  Finally, in the latter half of the 1930s, the ratio of the bank borrowings 
started to rise, and it stayed at a very high  level  until  the  1980s.           
      The last point relates to the transformation of the Japanese economic system in 
wartime. As we have discussed in other papers in detail, due to the government 
interventions and environmental changes during the war, substantial changes, 
complementary to one another, occurred across many aspects of the economic system, 
including finance, employment and industry, and as a result a prototype of the post-war 
economic system emerged.    With respect to finance, banks came to play a major role in 
corporate finance, becoming a substitute for the capital market, and various 
organizational and institutional devices were introduced to support the system of 
indirect finance (Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara eds. 1999; Okazaki 1994, 1995, 1999b, 
2000; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001).   
     The first and the second points relate to a controversy over the type of pre-war 
financial system that existed. Ishii [1997] stressed that banks played a major role in the 1890s and 1900s, the period of “industrial revolution” (pp.139-140).  The first point 
suggests that this view concerning the period of industrial revolution can be upheld, 
with some qualifications.  The qualifications are that in addition to banks, the capital 
market also played a substantial role.  Also, it should be noted that Table 1 includes 
the individual sector as well as corporate sector, and that for major companies the 
capital market was a central source of finance even in the period of industrial revolution 
(Fujino and Teranishi 2000, pp.408-409).   
     On the other hand, the second point, in addition to the development of the stock 
market confirmed in Figure 1 and Table 1, suggests that we should understand the 
pre-war financial system in dynamic terms.  That is to say, while banks played a 
substantial role in the process of industrial revolution, the capital market later 
developed and came to replace the role of banks. To put it differently, the Japanese 
financial system experienced a transition from a system where banks played a 
substantial role in addition to that of the capital market, to a market-oriented system, 
in the pre-war period.  Taking this view, we can see more clearly the significance of 
investigating capital market development in the pre-war period, as well as the 
implications of the wartime experiences, which shifted the direction of pre-war financial 
development.   
       Next, we look at the position of the TSE among all the stock exchanges in 
pre-war Japan.    The TSE was established in 1878, as the first stock exchange, based on 
the Stock Exchange Act. The Stock Exchange Act prescribed that the stock exchange 
should have a license from the government, and that it should be a joint-stock company 
with capital not smaller than 100 thousand yen. The Osaka Stock Exchange (Osaka 
Kabushiki Torihikijo, OSE) followed the TSE in the same year.    Although the Ministry 
of Finance had a policy to approve only the TSE and OSE at first, it changed the policy 
in 1880.  As a result, stock exchanges were established in Yokohama (1880), Kobe 
(1883), Kyoto (1884), and Nagoya (1886) (TSE 2002, p.7).  In 1887 the Exchange Act 
was passed, which prescribed that the exchange, including the stock exchange, should 
be a membership organization, not a joint-stock company. This act provoked a 
controversy about the legal framework for the exchange, and consequently the 
Exchange Law was framed, and this law came to be the fundamental legal basis of the 
exchange throughout the pre-war period. The Exchange Law allowed choice between a 
membership organization and a joint-stock company, and reduced the lower limit of 
capital to 30 thousand yen for an exchange which chose to operate as a joint-stock 
company.  As the government adopted a liberal approach to licensing stock exchanges, 
many stock exchanges were established under the boom in the late 1890s.  However, because some of the newly established exchanges did not perform actual trading 
functions, the government changed the policy to scrap small stock exchanges in rural 
areas (TSE 1928, pp.6-8; TSE 2002, pp.16-18; Noda 1980, pp.240-242).   
     The process described above is reflected in Figure 3.  The bar diagram denotes 
the number of stock exchanges. The number of stock exchanges began with two (Tokyo 
and Osaka) in 1878.  While it increased to five in 1886, it decreased to three in 1891.  
Then a rapid increase in the number of exchanges began in 1894 and reached a peak of 
46 in 1897. After that it declined again, and has remained around 10 from the late 
1900s. 
     As long-term data on the volume of stocks traded at all the exchanges are not 
available, we cannot see the trends at the TSE in terms of trading volume.  So in 
Figure 3, we depict the position of the TSE in terms of its revenue, a major part of which 
was from trade commissions. The total revenues of stock exchanges experienced two 
large increases in the periods after the Russo-Japanese War and during World War I.  
After sharp fluctuations and a downward trend in the 1920s, it went up again in the 
1930s.  During this period, the TSE continued to have the largest revenue, except in 
1922 when the OSE topped the rankings.  The share of the TSE in terms of revenue 
was 60-70% until the early 1890s.  Although it declined to 20-30% in the late 1890s, 
when the number of stock exchanges increased sharply, it returned to 40-50% after the 
1900s. We can therefore say that the TSE was the largest stock exchange in pre-war 
Japan.   
      
3.Growth of the Tokyo market and the changing composition of the TSE listed 
companies 
            The stock market at the TSE was divided into two divisions. The Stock Exchange 
Act of 1878 classified stock transactions into spot transactions (genba torihiki) and 
futures transactions (teiki torihiki). Each spot contract resulted in delivery of the 
transacted stocks.  On the other hand, with respect to futures contracts, a buyer  
(seller) could resell (repurchase) the stocks as many times as he wished, until the 
delivery date, and at the delivery date only the difference between the sell and purchase 
prices was settled in cash (TSE 1928, p.454).  In other words, in the futures market, 
cash settlement was the normal settlement method. 
     The name used to refer to spot transactions was changed three times after the 
enactment of the Stock Exchange Act.  According to the Exchange Law of 1893, they 
were called jiki torihiki.  Then, through the organizational reform of the TSE in 1918, 
referred to below, the name genbutsu torihiki came to be used.  Finally, after the revision of the Exchange Law in 1922, they came to be known as jitsubutsu torihiki.  
Concerning futures transactions, the normal period between the start date of a 
transaction and the delivery date was three months, until the revision of the Exchange 
Law in 1922.  Through this revision, a new method of transaction, the short-term 
futures transaction, came to be introduced (tanki seisan torihiki).  In the short-term 
futures market, the period between the start of transaction to the delivery date was 
seven days, but after the delivery date, delivery could be postponed for up to one month. 
Corresponding to the introduction of the short-term futures transaction, the existing 
futures transaction was renamed the long-term futures transaction (choki seisan 
torihiki). Short-term futures transactions began at the Osaka Stock Exchange in 1922, 
and the TSE followed in 1924 (Osaka Stock Exchange 1928, p.42; TSE 1928, p.48; 
Kuwata 1940, pp.199-203). 
     Figure 4a shows the number of stocks listed on each market of the TSE.  The 
following two points should be noted.  First, it was each name of the stocks, not each 
company that was listed. This was due to the installment system of capital.  For 
example, assume that a company had issued 20 thousand stocks, whose face value was 
50 yen each.  That is to say, the capital of the company was one million yen.  Also 
assume that this company issued new stocks, say another 20 thousand stocks, whose 
face value was 50 yen each.  In this case, it was possible that the company collected 
only a part of the face value from the shareholders. If the company collected half of it, 
the paid-in face value of the new stocks was 25 yen each, and the new paid-in capital of 
the company was one million and 500 thousand yen.  Therefore, there were two kinds 
of company stocks, with different paid-in face values, 50 yen and 25 yen. It was possible 
for these two stocks to be listed at the same stock exchange under different names. 
Second, the set of the stocks listed on the short-term futures market were a subset of 
the stocks listed on the long-term futures market, which in turn were a subset of the 
stocks listed on the spot market.   
          The number of the listed names, which began with four in 1878, increased steadily 
(Figure 4a).    Until 1896, all of the listed stocks were listed on both the spot market and 
the (long-term) futures market, and after that a small number of names emerged which 
were listed only on the spot market. A substantial change occurred in 1918.  In this 
year, the number of listed names increased sharply from 233 to 402, and the relatively 
rapid rate of increase continued thereafter. A large number of the newly listed names 
were those which were listed only on the spot market. To put it in another way, after 
1918, the names listed on the spot market and those listed on the futures market 
diverged.  In 1924, the short-term futures market started at the TSE, as stated above.  However, the number of names listed on the short-term futures market was small.  It 
was just 36 in 1936. 
     The reason for the sharp increase in the number of listed names on the spot 
market in 1918 was the organizational reform of the TSE.  Under the boom that 
prevailed during World War I, spot transactions of stocks became active outside the TSE. 
These transactions were carried by spot wholesalers (genbutsu donya) and merchants 
called saitorinin, who acted as intermediaries between spot wholesalers (Association of 
the TSE Saitori Members 1975, p.65, 72). The TSE wanted to gain control over the spot 
transactions being conducted outside it, and the government supported the TSE. 
Consequently, thirty saitorinin came to do their businesses inside the TSE when spot 
transactions at the TSE changed their name from jiki torihiki to genbutsu torihiki, as 
stated above.  Also, the TSE set up the Monitoring Department (Kansatsu-bu) to 
ensure that spot transactions were conducted in an appropriate fashion (TSE 1928. 
p.46; TSE 2002, p.30; Association of the TSE Saitori Members 1975, p.72). This implies 
that the TSE internalized spot transactions which had formerly flourished outside. 
Whereas the spot market of the TSE expanded sharply in terms of the number of listed 
names, the turnover rate of the spot market was relatively low, and the scale of the 
futures market was far larger in terms of trading volume.  In particular, the volume 
traded on the short-term spot market grew very rapidly (Figure 4b).   
     Figure 4c denotes the increase of listed stocks in terms of the total face value.  
While it is similar to Figure 3a, the rate of increase was higher, due to the growth of 
each company.  Also, the relative scale of the futures markets was larger.  As stated 
below, on the futures markets, especially on the short-term futures market, relatively 
large firms were listed.     
          In Figure 5, we compare the total face value of the TSE listed stocks and the total 
capital of all the joint-stock companies in Japan. As only the data of paid-in capital are 
available for the period prior to 1914, we estimated the capital by applying the ratio of 
the paid-in capital to the capital in 1915 (68.1%), to that period.    According to Figure 5, 
the share of the TSE listed stocks was 30-40% until World War I, except for the short 
period after the Russo-Japanese War.  In the late 1910s, the share went up to around 
50%, and it continued to rise until the 1930s.  Although the position of the TSE listed 
companies was very small in terms of number, it was substantial in terms of capital. 
     Next we examine the composition of the TSE listed companies and how this 
changed over time.  Here, we deem that a company was listed if at least one of the 
names of the stocks the company issued was listed.  We  focus  on the years, 1878, 1885, 
1900, 1915, 1925 and 1935.  1885 was the year just before the first wave of corporate establishments. 1900 was the year after that wave and the boom in the late 1890s.  
1915 was the year between the boom after the Russo-Japanese War and World War I 
boom.    1925 was the year during the depression after World War I.    1935 was the year 
after the Great Depression and the recovery from it.   
          A complete list of the listed stocks and their face values is available in the business 
reports of the TSE from 1900 to 1918.  So, we take the data on the listed names and 
capital for the years 1900 and 1915 from this source.  The information on the listed 
names in 1878 and 1885 was taken from the TSE[1928].  The TSE[1928] tell us the 
date when each name was listed and the date when it was unlisted for the companies 
whose stocks were traded on the futures market.  On the other hand, there was no 
name listed solely on the spot market until 1896.  Therefore, with respect to 1878 and 
1885, we can make a list of listed names based on the data.  The information on the 
capital of each company was taken from various government reports, including the 
Bank Section of the Ministry of Finance, Ginko-ka Hokoku (The Report of the Bank 
Section), the Bank Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, Ginko-kyoku Nenpo (Annual 
Report of the Bank Bureau), the Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet, Teikoku Tokei 
Nenkan ( The Imperial Statistical Year Book), the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce, Noshomu Tokei Hyo (The Statistics of Agriculture and Commerce).  With 
respect to 1925 and 1935, we take the data on the listed names and their face value 
from the original TSE business reports, held at the TSE. 
     In terms of the attributes of a listed company, other than its capital, we focus on 
the district where its headquarters were located, establishment year and type of 
industry.    The information on the location and establishment year for 1878 and 1885 is 
taken from the government reports mentioned above.  With respect to the other years, 
we obtained the information from the Commercial Credit Bureau, Zenkoku Shogaisha 
Yakuinroku (Directory of Corporate Directors), 1900 and 1912 issues, the Tokyo Credit 
Bureau,  Ginko Kaisha Yoroku ( Directory of Banks and Companies) 1925 and 1935 
issues, the Teikoku Credit Bureau, Teikoku Ginko Kaisha Yoroku (Imperial Directory of 
Banks and Companies) 1925 issue, and Osakaya Shoten, Kabushiki Nenkan (Year Book 
of Corporate Stocks) 1926 and 1936 issues.  The business reports and their associated 
original documents held by the TSE do not show the industry classification, but it seems 
that the names are arranged according to the order of industry.  So we identify the 
industry referring to this order and the name of the company. We use the industry 
classification  employed  by  the  TSE  [1938].           
     First,  we  look  at  the  composition  of the TSE listed companies by industry.    At the 
end of 1878, just after the establishment of the TSE, only four companies were listed (Table 2).  In 1885, the number of listed companies increased to 24 (Table 3a).  It is 
notable that those companies were concentrated within a single industry, that is, 
banking.  Twenty out of the 24 listed companies were banks, and in particular 19 of 
them were national banks.    This characteristic arguably reflects the legal environment.   
As is well known, there was no general corporate law until the Commercial Law was 
enacted in 1893.  In this situation, the National Bank Act prescribed the limited 
liability and the right of shareholders (Miyamoto 1990, Takamura 1996; Yoshida 1998, 
p.28).  The fact that most of the companies listed on the TSE were national banks 
suggests that the National Bank Act provided the legal framework that allowed many 
minority shareholders to invest in national banks.   
     In 1890, the number of listed companies increased to 96.  While the number of 
listed banks declined due to the abolition of the national bank system, many railways 
companies were newly listed.    However, the share of the railway companies was not so 
high (30.2%), compared with the banks in 1885.  Unlike the situation in 1885, 
companies of various industries, including coal and petroleum, cotton spinning, other 
textiles and foods, were listed.  In 1915, the types of industries represented by the 
listed companies had become even more diversified.   There were 160 listed companies, 
and the information on their attributes is available for 151 of them.  The share of the 
railway companies declined to 21.2%.  While new companies running electric railways 
in the urban areas emerged, large railway companies disappeared due to the 
nationalization of the main lines in 1906 (Noda 1980, pp.310-313).  The electricity 
industry saw its share go up sharply from 1900 to 1915.  The electricity companies, 
which were in the early stages of development and needed large-scale investment, 
actively raised funds from the stock market (Kikkawa 1995, chapter 1).  Besides 
electricity, the shares of such industries as coal and petroleum, sugar, and gas, also 
went up in this period. 
     In 1925, the number of listed companies reached 712, due to the expansion of the 
spot market after 1918. Information on company attributes is available for 695 of these.   
The industries had become even more diverse than they were in 1915.    The share of the 
railways, which still had the largest share, was only 8.3%.  The shares of such 
industries as insurance, machinery, chemistry and metal, which developed during 
World War I, went up.  In 1935, 919 companies were listed, and information on 
attributes is available for 899.  The composition by industry was similar to that in 
1925.     
     Table 3b shows the composition of the companies listed on the futures market, by 
industry. We focus on 1925 and 1935, because most of the companies listed on the spot market were also listed on the futures market prior to the late 1910s.  Comparing the 
composition in 1925 with the composition in the same year in Table 4a, we find that in 
the futures market, the shares of railway and electricity were higher, and in this sense 
the composition of the listed companies on the futures market was close to the 
composition of all the listed companies in 1915.  This is because the major increase of 
listed companies in the late 1910s occurred on the spot market, as stated above.  On 
the other hand, compared with the composition in 1915, the shares of such industries as 
shipping, insurance, chemical, and metal were higher in the composition of the futures 
market in 1925.  This implies that companies in these newly developing industries 
were listed not only on the spot market, but also on the futures market, which was more 
liquid.  The composition of the companies listed on the futures market in 1935 was 
similar to that in 1925. 
     Second, let us look at the composition of the listed companies by location of the 
headquarters.    Although, all of the four listed companies in 1878 were located in Tokyo, 
the proportion of the companies in Tokyo declined to 50% in 1885 (Table 4).    After that, 
the share of the companies in Tokyo increased slowly, but from 1925 to 1935 it declined 
again. In 1885, as the shares for Kanto region excluding Tokyo and Chubu region were 
also high, the total share for the eastern regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu) 
was higher than 90%.  It is noteworthy that from that date the total share for the 
eastern regions continued to decline until 1935.  Meanwhile, the shares for the other 
regions, especially Kinki region, went up.  The decline of the share for the eastern 
regions implies that the whole country came to fall under the TSE umbrella.   
     Third, Table 5 shows the basic statistics on scale distribution in terms of capital.  
The table confirms that the average capital continued to increase from 1878.    It should 
be noted that whereas the maximum value of capital also increased, the minimum value 
of capital stayed at around the same level.  This implies that relatively small 
companies could make use of the TSE market until the 1930s, while existing companies 
grew and large companies were newly listed.  Comparing the scale of the listed 
companies between the spot market and the futures markets, we find that the average 
capital of the companies listed on the long-term futures market was 2-3 times larger 
than that of the companies listed on the spot market, and the average capital of the 
companies listed on at the short-term futures market was several times still larger than 
the former group. The differences of scale between the markets become clearer in terms 
of the minimum value of capital.  Actually, the companies listed on the short-term 
futures market were the largest companies of each industry.  As is shown in the next 
section, the TSE set higher listing criteria for the futures markets, especially for the short-term futures market. 
     Finally, the basic statistics on the age distribution of the listed companies are 
shown in Table 6. In 1878, the average age was as low as 1.50 years. This is because the 
company system itself had just been introduced.  After that, the average age went up 
to 16.6 years in 1915, but declined in 1925.  This is probably because many young 
companies were listed in the wave of new listings after 1918.  After 1925, the average 
age rose again.    As in the case of scale, whereas the average displayed an upward trend, 
the minimum age did not change.  Except for 1885, companies which had been 
established in the same year or one year before were listed.    To put it differently, newly 
established companies could make use of the TSE market. 
 
4. Listing system and determinants of new listings 
How and why did the listed companies increase in number ?  In order to answer 
this question, we need to understand the listing system including the listing criteria.  
Because systematic materials, which show the history of the listing system of the TSE, 
are not available at this moment, we are going to create an outline of the listing system 
by bringing together a range of scattered information. The internal rules of the TSE 
enacted in 1915 prescribed as follows (Research Bureau of the Bank of Japan 1916, 
p.93).   
 
When a joint-stock company requests the TSE to start trading its stocks or 
debentures, the TSE should examine its articles of incorporation as well as its 
assets and business status to decide whether the request should be approved or not 
( A r t i c l e   1 ) .             
 
Also, the Exchange Act, which was drawn up according to the revision of the Exchange 
Law in 1922, obliged the exchange to set up a council to decide on when a trading item 
could be listed or removed.     
What criteria were used by the TSE when carrying out an examination to decide 
on a listing ?  As stated below, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce set the 
listing criteria for the futures market in 1914.  Concerning the criteria used before 
1914, the TSE[1928] provided the following. 
 
        When the Exchange Law was passed in 1893, the government instructed the TSE to 
increase the number of names traded as much as possible. Consequently, the TSE 
replaced the existing criteria (number of stocks no fewer than 4 thousand, total face value not less than 200 thousand yen, and total paid-in face value not less than 100 
thousand yen) with the new criteria (number of stocks no fewer than 3 thousand, 
total face value not less than 150 thousand yen, and total paid-in face value not less 
than 75 thousand yen).  The TSE decided that the stocks under the new criteria 
should be traded only on the spot market.  The new criteria were used from May 
1894 (pp.33-34). 
 
The quote above implies that with respect to the spot market no concrete listing criteria 
existed. As TSE [1963] records show that there was no legal regulation covering listing 
until 1914, we can infer from the above quote what the listing criterion for the futures 
market was. In 1914, when the Exchange Law was revised, the detailed enforcement 
regulations of the Law prescribed that the listing of securities on the futures market 
should be approved by the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.  Accordingly, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce determined the listing criteria for the futures 
market (i. Not less than 2 years since establishment, ii. Total paid-in face value not less 
than one million yen for the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges, and not less than 500 
thousand yen for other stock exchanges). In 1915, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce added the criterion for new stocks of a company whose stocks had already 
been listed on the futures market. In this case, the criterion for the total paid in face 
value was “not less than 500 thousand yen for the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges, 
and not less than 250 thousand yen for other stock exchanges (TSE 1963, Chapter on 
Institutions, p.3). 
     Based on the regulations, the TSE determined the following listing criteria. Until 
May 1921, the criteria of the TSE were number of stocks no fewer than 40 thousand as 
well as the three conditions prescribed by the government (i～iii).  In May 1921, the 
criteria of the TSE were revised to the following 
 
a. Not less than 2 years since establishment, 
b. Total face value not less than 3 million yen             
            Total paid-in face value not less than one million yen 
            Number of stocks no fewer than 60 thousand 
    c. In the case of new stocks of a company whose stocks have already been listed on 
the  futures  market   
            Total face value not less than 2 million yen 
            Total paid-in face value not less than 500 thousand yen 
            Total number of stocks no fewer than 40 thousand  
These new criteria were used at least until the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 
1937 (The Research Section of the TSE [1932]; Hatano[1938]).  With respect to the 
listing criteria for the spot market, TSE [1932] records state, “Unlike the futures 
market, we do not impose any condition on the listed names.”  We can infer that no 
concrete listing criteria existed for the spot market.     
     What kind of companies were listed, and when?  As mentioned in Section 1, 
Pagano et al.[1998] explored this issue.  They analyzed the determinants of IPOs by 
referring to the panel data of Italian firms in 1982-1992.  Using the firms that 
conformed to the listing criteria for the Milan Stock Exchange, and at the same time 
were not listed, as samples, they regressed the dummy variable denoting IPO to several 
explanatory variables on corporate attributes and the environment.  It was found that 
some variables including sales, sales growth, ROA, average market-to-book ratio of the 
public firms in the same industry, had a positive effect on the decision to go public.  
Here, we analyze the determinants of new listing on the TSE, referring to the 
framework of Pagano et al.[1998], as well as the characteristics of the prewar Japanese 
stock market, its institutional environment and the available data.       
     We focus on cotton spinning companies from 1905-1936. As is well known, the 
cotton spinning industry was a leading industry in pre-war Japan, and therefore 
relatively many of these companies were listed on the TSE.  Also, it is notable that 
systematic data are available on both unlisted and listed companies.  The data on 
cotton spinning firms are taken from the various issues of the Menshi Boseki Jijo 
Sankosho (Reference Book on the Japan Cotton Spinning Industry) published by the 
Japan Cotton Spinning Association.  We start our analysis from 1905, because it was 
from this year that the financial data in the Menshi Boseki Jijo Sankosho was 
presented in systematic form.  We take all the companies whose financial data are 
available in the Menshi Boseki Jijo Sankosho as the primary samples, and checked 
whether they were listed on the TSE or not at the end of each year by referring to the 
materials used in Section 3.  Figure 6a presents an overview of the samples.  The 
number of sample firms in each year was 25-35 until the late 1910s, and 50-70 after 
that.    Of these, the number of firms listed on the TSE was 5-6 until the late 1910s, and 
it increased to more than 20 in the late 1920s and 1930s.  The number of firms listed 
on the long-term futures market was nine at the peak (1933-35).  Until 1932, the only 
firm listed on the short-term futures market was Kanegafuchi Boseki, and Nisshin 
Boseki was listed in 1933. 
          The geographical distribution of the cotton spinning companies and those listed on the TSE should be noted.  It is well known that the center of the cotton spinning 
industry in Japan was Osaka (Takamura 1971).  The samples here reflect this fact 
(Figure 6b).  The proportion of companies located in the eastern regions (Hokkaido, 
Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu) was 42% at the peak (1936) and 14% at the bottom (1914).  
However, companies from the eastern regions nevertheless represented a higher 
proportion of listed companies.  Actually, comparing the ratio of listed companies 
between the eastern and the other regions, we find that eastern regions were far more 
highly represented among listed companies.  This suggests that there was a kind of 
home bias with respect to listing on the TSE.  At the same time, the difference in the 
ratios of the listed companies declined after the late 1910s, which is consistent with the 
facts shown in Table 4.    Using this data set, we estimate the following equation. 
 
 
 P r ( L it=1)=F(α0＋α1NPCAPit-1＋α2NAGEit-1＋α3ROEit-1＋α4EASTi＋α5REFORMt-1
＋α6EASTi*REFORMt-1＋α7LAWt-1） 
           
Lit is the dummy variable which equals 1, if firm i was newly listed on the TSE in 
year t, and 0, otherwise.  As the number of sample firms which were listed on the 
futures market was small, we focus on the spot market.    In estimating this equation we 
use the data on the firms which were not listed in year t-1, following Pagano et al[1998].   
As stated above, there was no concrete listing criterion for the spot market.    F(･) refers 
to a cumulative distribution function.    NPCAP is the paid-in capital normalized by the 
average paid-in capital of the total joint-stock companies in Japan.  AGE is the firm 
age. We have normalized these variables because we used the long-term data for a 
32-year period and there are upward trends in these variables.  ROE is the return on 
equity.  EAST is the dummy variable which equals 1, where the headquarters of the 
firm was located in the eastern regions, and 0, otherwise.  Our intention is to capture 
the home bias mentioned above.  REFORM is the dummy variable which equals 1 in 
1918 and after.  This is a variable to capture the effect of the organizational reform in 
1918, and we intend to capture the effect of this reform on the home bias by the 
interaction term of REFORM and EAST. 
     LAW is the dummy variable which equals 1 in 1911 and after, and 0, otherwise.  
It is the variable to capture the revision of the Commercial Law in 1911.  After the 
Commercial Law was passed in 1893, it was substantially revised in 1900 and again in 
1911.  The background to the 1911 revision was that numerous bubble companies 
emerged in the boom after the Russo-Japanese War.  Major revisions directly relating to corporate governance were as follows.  First, an article on the joint responsibility of 
the directors was added.    Second, whereas a director was exempt from responsibility if 
he opposed a decision and advised the auditors of this fact, before the revision, the 
article containing this exemption was deleted. Third, for the case where a director 
inflicted damage on the company through illegal actions such as the issuing of bogus 
dividends or speculation, criminal punishment was introduced (Fujii 1999 pp.134-146).  
If these revisions were effective in protecting minority shareholders, we can expect the 
coefficient of LAW to be positive.  We estimate the equation by LOGIT model.  Also, 
taking the that the number of positive observations of L is as small as 18, we run 
Poisson regressions. The estimation results are reported in Table 7.    The results of the 
Logit and the Poissson regressions are qualitatively the same.  The coefficients of 
NPCAP and NAGE are positive and statistically significant.  The provability of listing 
was higher for those firms who were older and whose paid-in capital was larger, 
compared with the averages of each year. The sign of ROE is not stable or significant.  
On the other hand, the coefficient of EAST is positive and significant.  This suggests 
that there was home bias in listing on the TSE.  The sign of REFORM is positive as 
expected, and it is significant, if we exclude LAW.  Also, the coefficient of the 
interaction term of REFORM and EAST is negative and significant.  We can say that 
the reform in 1918 contributed to reducing the home bias.  Finally, the coefficient of 
LAW is positive and significant, which suggests that the revision of the Commercial 
Law in 1911 was effective in protecting minority shareholders, and thereby promoted 
company listing. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
          The scale of the stock market relative to the scale of national economy was large in 
late 1920s and 1930s Japan, compared with the scale in post-war Japan, with that in 
1930s US, and also with those in most other countries at the time.  This fact supports 
the view that the pre-war Japanese financial system was market-oriented, which we 
have stressed elsewhere, and at the same time it raises the question how and why the 
stock market grew to be so large in pre-war Japan.    This paper has been an attempt to 
[shed some light on][answer] this question.     
In this paper, we confirmed the [dominant] position of the TSE in the Japanese 
stock market, and constructed a comprehensive list of the companies listed on the TSE 
since its establishment, matching this with other information on corporate attributes.  
Through this analysis, the following facts became clear.  The TSE grew as a result of 
the increase in the number of listed companies.  Many companies in the newly developing industries came to be listed on the stock exchange.  Also, companies in 
regions other than the eastern regions came to be listed.  In other words, the bias in 
the geographical distribution of the listed companies, which was large at first, declined 
over time.  Furthermore, the TSE was open to relatively small and young companies.  
Although scale and age of the listed companies increased continuously, the minimum 
scale and age remained stable. One of significant background factors was the 
organizational reform carried out in 1918.  Through this, the spot transactions being 
conducted outside were absorbed into the TSE, and the spot market of the TSE was 
substantially expanded. 
     Based on descriptive observations, we analyzed the determinants of new listings 
on the TSE, using the panel data of the cotton spinning industry.  Several interesting 
points were confirmed.  There was a home bias that the provability of new listing[s] 
was higher for the firms in the eastern region, but this bias was reduced by the 
organizational reform of the TSE.  Also, the revision of the Commercial Law had a 
positive effect on the provability of new listings, which implies the revision contributed 
to the protection of minority shareholders and promoted new listings.  These points 
confirm the effectiveness of our approach which utilized long-term historical data going 
back to the early stages of stock market development.    However, many issues remain to 
be investigated. One of the issues is to explore the effects of listing on the TSE.  
Through this, we will be able to find out why it was that companies wanted to be listed 
on  the  TSE.      
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Figure 1 Intertemporal Comparison of the Stock Market Development in
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US（1936）Table 1 Sources of fund for the corporate sector 
Amount（million yen, 100 million yen） Parcentage
Total Stock Debenture Borrowing Stock Debenture Borrowing
1886-1890 162 68 0 94 42.0 0.2 57.9
1891-1895 175 85 11 79 48.6 6.3 45.2
1896-1900 717 226 4 487 31.5 0.6 67.9
1901-1905 458 111 30 317 24.2 6.5 69.4
1906-1910 1,016 270 112 633 26.6 11.1 62.4
1911-1915 1,567 420 121 1,026 26.8 7.7 65.5
1916-1920 10,107 4,542 264 5,301 44.9 2.6 52.5
1921-1925 5,958 1,778 1,220 2,961 29.8 20.5 49.7
1926-1930 5,187 2,430 1,414 1,343 46.9 27.3 25.9
1931-1935 1,210 1,629 69 -488 134.6 5.7 -40.3
1936-1940 24,476 10,538 1,641 12,297 43.1 6.7 50.2
1941-1945 100,373 16,794 6,378 77,201 16.7 6.4 76.9
1946-1950 16,350 2,134 574 13,642 13.0 3.5 83.4
1951-1955 42,308 5,955 1,592 34,761 14.1 3.8 82.2
1956-1960 98,783 14,029 4,652 80,102 14.2 4.7 81.1
1961-1965 241,680 33,697 10,559 197,423 13.9 4.4 81.7
1966-1970 430,294 29,161 13,203 387,930 6.8 3.1 90.2
1971-1975 954,042 53,736 36,872 863,434 5.6 3.9 90.5
1976-1980 846,570 59,756 36,321 750,493 7.1 4.3 88.7
1981-1985 1,147,714 88,586 40,254 1,018,874 7.7 3.5 88.8
Source: Fujino and Teranishi[2000] pp.546-547; Toyo Keizai Shinposha[1991] p.356.
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Figure 3 The position of the TSE： A long-term trend



















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5   (Total face value of the TSE listed stocks)／(Total
capital of
all the joint-stock companies in Japan)Table 2　Listed companies at the end of 1878
Name of the company Industry PrefectCapital Establishment year
Daiichi Bank Bank Tokyo 1,500,000 1876
Tokyo Kabutocho Rice Exchange Exchange Tokyo 40,000 1876
Tokyo Kakigaracho Rice ExchangeExchange Tokyo 50,000 1876
Tokyo Stock Exchange Exchange Tokyo 200,000 1878
Source: See the text.Table 3a　Composition of the TSE listed companies by industry（Total TSE listed companies ）
1885 1900 1915 1925 1935
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Total 24 100.0 Total 96 100.0 Total 151 100.0 Total 695 100.0 Total 899 100.0
1 Bank 20 83.3 Railway 29 30.2 Railway 32 21.2 Railway 58 8.3 Railway 84 9.3
2 Exchange 2 8.3 Coal and petroleum 6 6.3 Electricity 15 9.9 Electricity 52 7.5 Bank 65 7.2
3 Railway 1 4.2 Cotton spinning 6 6.3 petroleum 11 7.3 Insurance 52 7.5 Insurance 61 6.8
4 e 1 4.2 Other textiles 6 6.3 Bank 9 6.0 Bank 47 6.8 Electricity 59 6.6
5 Bank 5 5.2 Sugar 9 6.0 Commerce 44 6.3 Machinery 57 6.3
6 Foods 5 5.2 Foods 7 4.6 Foods 37 5.3 Commerce 54 6.0
7 Commerce 5 5.2 Cotton spinning 6 4.0 Chemical 36 5.2 Other textiles 51 5.7
8 Shipping 4 4.2 Exchange 6 4.0 Machinery 35 5.0 petroleum 42 4.7
9 Insurance 4 4.2 Other textiles 6 4.0 Cotton spinning 33 4.7 Chemical 42 4.7
10 Exchange 4 4.2 Gas 5 3.3 Other textiles 30 4.3 Foods 39 4.3
11 Paper 3 3.1 Commerce 5 3.3 petroleum 27 3.9 Metal 33 3.7
12 Electricity 3 3.1 Shipping 4 2.6 Real estate 27 3.9 Real estate 31 3.4





14 Shipbuilding 2 2.1
Miscellaneous
manufacturing 4 2.6 Development 23 3.3 Ceramics 28 3.1
15 Fertilizer 2 2.1 Paper 3 2.0 Metal 20 2.9
Other
transportation 24 2.7
16 transportation 2 2.1 Fertilizer 3 2.0 Ceramics 18 2.6 Development 21 2.3
17 Fishery 2 2.1 Machinery 3 2.0 Exchange 17 2.4 spinning 20 2.2
18 Gas 1 1.0 Shipbuilding 3 2.0 Sugar 15 2.2 Exchange 17 1.9
19 Entertainment 1 1.0 Chemical 3 2.0 Shipping 14 2.0 Rayon 16 1.8
20 Ceramics 1 1.0 Ceramics 3 2.0 Paper 13 1.9 Paper 16 1.8
Others 0 0.0 Others 2 2.1 Others 10 6.6 Others 72 10.4 Others 110 12.2Table 3b  Composition of the TSE listed companies by industry （Futures market）
Long-term futures market Short-term futures market
1925 1935 1935
Industry Number PercentageIndustry Number PercentageIndustry Number Percentage
Total 160 100.0 Total 152 100.0 Total 24 100.0
1 Railway 26 16.3 Electriclity 26 17.1 Metal 3 12.5
2 Electriclity 21 13.1 Railway 22 14.5 Coal and petroleum 3 12.5
3 Coal and petroleum 11 6.9 Cotton spinning 9 5.9 Exchange 3 12.5
4 Sugar 11 6.9 Exchange 8 5.3 Electriclity 2 8.3
5 Foods 8 5.0 Coal and petroleum 7 4.6 Sugar 2 8.3
6 Shipping 7 4.4 Chemical 7 4.6 Cotton spinning 2 8.3
7 Other textiles 7 4.4 Other transportation 6 3.9 Rayon 2 8.3
8 Exchange 7 4.4 Sugar 6 3.9 Railway 1 4.2
9 Cotton spinning 6 3.8 Machinery 6 3.9 Paper 1 4.2
10 Chemical 6 3.8 Ceramics 6 3.9 Ceramics 1 4.2
11 Insurance 5 3.1 Foods 5 3.3 Other transportation 1 4.2
12 Bank 4 2.5 Metal 4 2.6 Foods 1 4.2
13 Paper 4 2.5 Fertilizer 4 2.6 Fishery 1 4.2
14 Metal 4 2.5 Rayon 4 2.6 Fertilizer 1 4.2
15 Machinery 4 2.5 Shipbuilding 4 2.6
16 Shipbuilding 4 2.5 Other textiles 4 2.6
17 Miscellaneous manufacturing 4 2.5 Insurance 4 2.6
18 Fishery 4 2.5 Gas 3 2.0
19 Ceramics 3 1.9 Bank 3 2.0
20 Gas 3 1.9 Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 2.0
Others 11 6.9 Others 11 7.2 Others 0 0.0Table 4a Geographical distribution of the TSE listed companies （total listed companies）
Number  Percentage
1885 1900 1915 1925 1935 1885 1900 1915 1925 1935
Total 24 96 151 695 899 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
East 22 77 121 536 650 91.7 80.2 80.7 77.1 72.3
Hokkaido 04279 0 4 . 2 1 . 3 1 . 0 1 . 0
　 Tohoku 2008 1 6 8 . 3 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 2 1 . 8
Kanto 17 67 110 487 569 70.8 69.8 73.3 70.1 63.3
Tokyo 12 54 89 440 506 50.0 56.3 59.3 63.3 56.3
Chubu 3 6 9 34 56 12.5 6.3 6.0 4.9 6.2
West 2 19 22 105 171 8.3 19.8 14.7 15.1 19.0
Kinki 2 11 16 82 135 8.3 11.5 10.7 11.8 15.0
Osaka 2 4 13 66 105 8.3 4.2 8.7 9.5 11.7
Chugoku 0 3 2 11 17 0.0 3.1 1.3 1.6 1.9
Shikoku 00015 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 6
Kyushu 0 5 5 11 14 0.0 5.2 2.7 1.6 1.6
Colonies 0 0 7 32 42 0.0 0.0 4.7 4.6 4.7
Overseas 0 0 0 22 36 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 4.0Table 4b Geographical distribution of the TSE listed companies （futures market）
Long-term Short-term
Number Percentage Number Percentage
1925 1935 1925 1935 1935 1935
Total 180 152 100.0 100.0 24 100.0
East 127 121 70.6 79.6 18 75.0
Hokkaido 2 2 1.1 1.3 0 0.0
　 Tohoku 3 2 1.7 1.3 0 0.0
Kanto 117 111 65.0 73.0 18 75.0
Tokyo 104 102 57.8 67.1 17 70.8
Chubu 5 6 2.8 3.9 0 0.0
West 20 21 11.1 13.8 4 16.7
Kinki 15 17 8.3 11.2 4 16.7
Osaka 13 15 7.2 9.9 4 16.7
Chugoku 2 3 1.1 2.0 0 0.0
Shikoku 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0
Kyushu 3 1 1.7 0.7 0 0.0
Colonies 11 8 6.1 5.3 1 4.2
Overseas 2 2 1.1 1.3 1 4.2Table 5 Scale distribution of the TSE listed companies （in terms of capital）
Total Long-term futuresShort-term futures
1878 1885 1900 1915 1925 1935 1925 1935 1935
Obs. 4 24 96 151 698 899 160 152 24
Max（1000 yen） 1,500 20,000 66,000 200,000 440,000 800,000 440,000 800,000 800,000
Min（1000 yen） 40 70 80 50 63 20 250 500 3,625
Mean（1000 yen） 448 1,302 4,216 8,141 11,705 13,816 27,589 45,549 121,325
Stdev（1000 yen） 705 4,033 9,000 18,405 27,108 39,368 47,302 84,385 168,737
Coeffeicient of variance 1.58 3.10 2.13 2.26 2.32 2.85 1.71 1.85 1.39Table 6 Age distribution of the TSE listed companies 
Total Short-term
futures market
1878 1885 1900 1915 1925 1935 1925 1935 1935
Obs. 4 24 96 151 698 899 160 152 24
Max（year） 2 9 28 43 53 63 53 63 63
Min（year） 0 4 0 1 0 0 3 1 6
Mean（year） 2 7 10 17 14 20 21.53 28.17 33.67
Stdev（year） 1 1 6 10 11 13 11.97 13.87 16.60



























































































































































































Proportion of the companies in the Eastern
district in the total cotton spinnig samples
Proportion of the companies in the Eastern
district in the listed cotton spinning samples
Figure 6b Eastern district bias and its decline in the cotton spinnig companies listed at the
TSETable 7 Determinants of new listing at the TSE
Dependent variable：Lit
Estimation methodes LOGIT LOGIT POISSON POISSON
Constant -11.545 (-5.041) *** -0.713 (-5.808) *** -10.872 (-5.571) *** -7.012 (-5.992) ***
NCAP 0.075 ( 3.333) *** 0.063 ( 3.000) *** 0.0668 ( 4.245) *** 0.056 ( 3.715) ***
AGE 0.044 ( 1.936) * 0.037 ( 1.671) * 0.0431 ( 1.982) ** 0.037 ( 1.759) *
ROE 1.409 ( 0.733) 0.900 ( 0.554) 1.402 ( 0.982) 0.912 ( 0.857)
EAST 6.413 ( 3.960) *** 3.759 ( 3.021) *** 5.835 ( 3.938) *** 3.476 ( 3.038) ***
REFORM 2.121 ( 1.645) * 2.266 ( 2.003) ** 2.091 ( 1.464) 2.175 ( 1.907) *
EAST*REFORM -6.418 (-3.648) *** -3.844 (-2.636) *** -5.821 (-3.540) *** -3.543 (-2.543) **
LAW 4.260 ( 2.796) *** 3.659 ( 3.654) ***
R
2 0.071 0.035 0.071 0.0336
Log likelihood -72.040 -76.521 -73.179 -77.352
Obs. 938 938 938 938
Positive obs. 18 18 18 18
t-values in parentheses
　　***　significant at 1% level
　　**　　significant at 5% level